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Abstract Pests and diseases are key production constraints
for Ugandan small-scale farmers. In 2010, the Ugandan Gov-
ernment, as part of its agricultural development strategy,
adopted plant clinics to improve plant health extension for
farmers and to contribute to strengthening disease surveil-
lance. Despite government commitment and a growing de-
mand for this new type of farmer service, effective implemen-
tation of plant clinics turned out to be a challenge.We examine
how agricultural policies and institutional setups, and their
political context, influenced the implementation of plant
clinics from 2010 to 2011. We argue that the political agenda
surrounding the decentralization and agricultural extension
reforms, initiated in 1997, substantially weakened the Minis-
try of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries and
undermined institutional stability and the effectiveness of
delivery of public extension services. Implementation of plant
clinics was further affected by a new district reform and the
national elections taking place during the study period. The
dual purpose of the plant clinics created uncertainty about
their organisational belonging. They fell through the cracks
of extension and disease control. This was exacerbated by the
unclear roles and authority of the Ministry vs. local govern-
ments. For plant clinics to succeed the fundamental issues of
governance, resources and implementation structure need to
be addressed. The Ugandan experience shows the importance
of understanding not only the policy and institutional frame-
works in which plant clinics operate, but also the effects of
political imperatives and donors on policy implementation.
This study provides a basis for institutional and policy analy-
sis related to the implementation of plant clinics elsewhere.
Keywords Uganda . Plant clinics . Agricultural policy .
Politics . Agricultural extension . Plant health
Introduction
This paper seeks to identify and understand the extent to
which politics, policy and pre-existing institutions have influ-
enced the way plant clinics have been implemented in Ugan-
da. Pests and diseases are some of the main production con-
straints, leading to significant yield losses and sub-standard
quality of produce among small-scale farmers (Benin et al.
2007; Bukenya 2010; Savary et al. 2012).Major pests, such as
cassava mosaic disease, cassava brown streak disease, banana
bacterial wilt, Striga and wheat stem rust Ug99, constitute a
constant threat to the food security and livelihoods of sub-
Saharan African farmers (Vurro et al. 2010; Beed 2014). Like
most African countries, Uganda is ill equipped to safeguard
crops against existing and emerging pest risks associated with
climate change, increasing globalization and human mobility.
Diagnostic services, for example, are scarce and poorly coor-
dinated (Smith et al. 2008; Miller et al. 2009). At an average
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extension worker-to-farmer ratio of only 1:3,189 (MAAIF
2012), most Ugandan farmers do not have any access to
agricultural extension services (UBOS 2010; Bashaasha
et al. 2011). Public crop protection measures are mainly
restricted to border control and sporadic field inspections with
hardly any services to deal with farmers’ day-to-day crop
health problems. There is a pervasive feeling among Ugandan
extension organisations and line ministry officials that farmers
have been abandoned in their struggle against an escalating
plant pest and disease burden (Danielsen et al. 2012).
In 2006, four pilot plant clinics were established in three
districts of Uganda (Mukono, Iganga and Soroti) as a novel
way to provide plant health advice to farmers. The plant clinic
initiative was started with technical and financial support from
the Global Plant Clinic (GPC) of CABI1 as a collaborative
effort between district local governments (LGs) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) as implementers and
the Department of Crop Protection of the Ministry of Agri-
culture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) as coordina-
tor.2 LG and NGO extension workers were trained by GPC
while MAAIF offered technical backstopping to the clinics
and participated in occasional monitoring visits with GPC
staff. At its core, a plant clinic is a simple rural service, run
by trained agricultural extension workers, often referred to as
‘plant doctors’, who operate in a similar way to community
health workers for humans. The plant clinics are set up to offer
general plant healthcare (diagnostics and advice on any prob-
lem in any crop, biotic and abiotic) and are open to everyone,
typically once a week or fortnight (Boa 2009).
Results from the pilot phase showed that plant clinics
have the potential to add value to extension by expanding
service coverage and improving regular collection of pest
and disease information at the farmer field level (Danielsen
and Mutebi 2010). These early results also indicated that the
plant clinics could become a vehicle for creating new syn-
ergies among farmers, extension, input suppliers, MAAIF
and experts from research institutes and universities, thus
more efficiently use existing resources and capacity
(Danielsen and Mutebi 2010). The plant clinic records of
farmer queries revealed a potential to become a multi-
purpose tool that could be used both for assessing service
quality and supporting decision making at local and central
level (Danielsen et al. 2013). These results convinced senior
managers within the Department of Crop Protection that the
dual-purposed plant clinics could help improve national
responsiveness to pest and disease risks by providing the
much needed plant health advisory services to farmers and
strengthening pest alertness on the ground. In this way the
plant clinics would complement the limited surveillance
resources and capacity of the Ministry (Danielsen and
Mutebi 2010).
Against this background, the plant clinics were officially
recognised by MAAIF in 2010 with their inclusion in the 5-
year Development Strategy and Investment Plan 2010/11–
2014/15 (DSIP) under the Pest and Disease Control sub-
programme managed by the Department of Crop Protection
(MAAIF 2010). This inclusion in the DSIP gave formal
endorsement for government funding and legitimised the ex-
pansion and consolidation of the plant clinic programme.
The plant clinic initiative was subsequently expanded in
2010 and 2011 although the scale of operations was still small
compared to the mainstream extension system. This phase
was characterised by new funding from CABI (small start-
up grants), MAAIF and some of the participating LGs and
NGOs, leading to enhanced actor engagement both at the
national and district levels. In the 2011/12 DSIP budget, 40
million Ugandan Shilling (~20,000 USD) were allocated to
plant doctor training of extension workers, provision of basic
plant clinic tool kits, monitoring visits and technical
backstopping (MAAIF 2011). The Department of Crop Pro-
tection of MAAIF created a small core team to organise plant
doctor training and stakeholder meetings, procure tool kits for
selected districts and carry out monitoring visits.
These positive developments notwithstanding, plant clinic
implementation faced severe challenges due to the national
political economic context and the influence it has had on
agricultural policy and institutions. It is often assumed that
once a policy has been decided, its implementation will be
relatively straightforward. However, policy implementation
consists of a series of policy decisions (Thomas and Grindle
1990) and is therefore subject to changes as the political
winds blow. Ignoring politics can have unintended conse-
quences for policy implementation (Dijkstra 2011). The
institutionalization of regular elections, can be a powerful
element in explaining why some policies get implemented
while others do not (Kjær and Therkildsen 2013). Elections
may drive policy design in directions that were not initially
intended (Faust 2010). Often there is a clash between what
is politically expedient and what is technically prudent.
Donors have an intrinsic influence. They may promote the
implementation of initiatives that would otherwise not have
been prioritized by government. Donors have a tendency to
base programmes on assumptions that underestimate the
challenges of policy coordination and reform (Faust 2010).
They also often fail to acknowledge their own influence on
reform processes. As Hout (2012) argues, donors habitually
are interested in ‘doing development’ by technically
implementing programmes to show results on the ground
rather than engaging with the more complex and difficult
1 In 2012, the GPC developed into Plantwise, a global, CABI
managed programme, aiming at strengthening plant health systems
through plant clinics in Africa, Asia and Latin America (33 coun-
tries in 2014).
2 In Uganda, agricultural extension is decentralised and falls under the
authority of the 112 district LGs, while MAAIF has a role of policy
guidance and oversight.
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political environment that perhaps may be important for
implementation.
In the following, we examine the agricultural extension and
pest and disease control policies in Uganda as well as the
political context in Uganda since the onset of administrative
decentralization in 1997. We describe plant clinic achieve-
ments from 2010 to 2011 and identify barriers to progress.
Finally, we discuss how the national politics, policies, and
institutional set-ups influenced plant clinic implementation.
This paper is a result of a broader study on plant health
systems in Uganda and represents an in-depth analysis of
one of the system components used by Danielsen and
Matsiko3 , namely, ‘policy, leadership and governance’.
Methods
We analysed plant clinic implementation in Uganda with a
focus on the period 2010 to 2011. The study districts included
those where plant clinics had been operating since 2006
(Soroti, Serere, Mukono and Buikwe) and others where the
plant clinic initiative started in 2010–2011 (Kayunga, Kumi,
Bukedea, Ngora, Bukwo, Katakwi, Hoima, Kasese and
Bundibugyo). Data were collected through semi-structured
interviews and review of plant clinic records. We also
reviewed relevant agricultural policy documents, budgets
and evaluation reports. Key policy and strategy documents
included: Local Governments Act (1997), The Plant Protec-
tion Act (1962), NAADS Act (2001), Agricultural Technolo-
gy and Agribusiness Advisory Services Project (World Bank
2010a), Development Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP)
(MAAIF 2010), Ministerial Policy Statement (MAAIF 2011),
and Proposed Action Plans for the Agricultural Revolution of
Uganda (MAAIF 2012). Key informants included plant clinic
staff and coordinators; political, administrative and technical
leaders from Local Governments; senior officials from
MAAIF and National Agricultural Advisory Services
(NAADS); relevant politicians, including a former minister
of agriculture; and representatives from donor agencies.
Table 1 lists the DSIP components and key actors of relevance
to the plant clinics, which will be referred to throughout the
paper.
Although the term ‘plant health’ has a wider connotation
than ‘crop protection’ and ‘pest and disease control’, these
three terms are used interchangeably in this paper, according
to how they were used by the informants and in the references.
Unless otherwise stated in the text, MAAIF refers to the
Department of Crop Protection.
Policy implementation
Plant clinics—progress and barriers
In the study period, 23 plant clinics were run in 13 districts and
more districts were beginning to show interest in joining. As
the following observations by several key informants indicate,
demand for better services to farmers and better pest informa-
tion systems became more explicit over the same period. A
Local Council V Chairman from central Uganda observed:
‘The farmers have lived with the diseases for so long that they
have become immune. They are used to big losses. Something
needs to be done’. One of the plant doctors was clear in his
view: ‘The plant clinics can do things that no other extension
method can’. A MAAIF official was similarly categorical
about the value of the plant clinics: ‘There is no other way
we can gather regular information about pests and diseases
from farmers’ fields’. Another Ministry official expanded on
this: ‘The plant clinics help improve extension and surveil-
lance and for the farmer it is help at the doorstep. Everybody
gets something out of it.’
Queries on more than 50 different crops, including a wide
range of roots and tubers, cereals, vegetables, pulses and
minor crops were presented by farmers to the plant clinics
from July 2010 to September 2011 (14 months). The clinics
received a total of 2,598 queries from 2,069 clients. These
clients came from 20 districts and 851 villages, covering
significant geographical distances within each district.4 Al-
though farm-level outcomes remain to be demonstrated, farm-
er testimonies revealed a strong demand for this type of
advisory service (Karubanga et al., unpublished). Farmers
appreciated the inclusiveness of the service and the ‘any crop,
any problem’ approach of the plant clinics. Most other farmer
services and projects, both NAADS and NGO-led, work with
defined farmer groups on selected crops and problems.
MAAIF’s renewed involvement enhanced staff visibility
and motivation. The plant doctor training courses, in particu-
lar, were well received. One of the trainees, an Assistant
Agricultural Officer from Ngora district, for example, had this
to say about the MAAIF-led training: ‘This is the first time in
the last 12 years I realise that I belong to the Ministry of
Agriculture!’
Apart from conducting plant doctor training, however,
there was limited progress with MAAIF’s other intended
contributions. Because of delays in the release of DSIP funds
and the Ministry’s bureaucratic procurement system, plant
clinic tool kits had not yet been delivered to the new districts
by the end of 2011 (interview with MAAIF senior official). In
3 Using a plant health system framework to assess plant clinic perfor-
mance—an example of cross-sectoral learning. Food Security
(submitted).
4 More detailed results on the Ugandan plant clinics, including the roles
and performance of NGOs vs. LGs, are presented in Danielsen and
Matsiko: Using a plant health system framework to assess plant clinic
performance—An example of cross-sectoral learning. Food Security
(submitted).
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addition, few ministry staff were available for clinic-related
activities, and operations were restricted by limited funds
and tardy administrative procedures. The overall DSIP bud-
get was not only partially funded (see next section) but was
also clouded by uncertainty about how much would be
available to support plant clinics (interview with senior
official, MAAIF). As a consequence, monitoring and
backstopping of plant clinics could not be carried out. There
was also little visible progress on the establishment of a
system for handling the data captured in the plant clinic
records. This is a key priority for MAAIF in enhancing the
national plant health information system and the attendant
disease surveillance.
Most plant clinics were scheduled to operate once a fort-
night. However, operations were irregular, especially in the
electoral period from late 2010 to March 2011 where there
were few LG-led plant clinic activities. The NGOs were less
affected by political and institutional events (see section on
elections and district reform). They maintained plant clinic
operations although with varying regularity. The erratic oper-
ations combined with insufficient publicity made several plant
clinics rather invisible and unstable.
While there were a few signs of incipient institutionalisation,
overall the plant clinics remained on the periphery of the
existing system. Some LGs included the plant clinics in
their budgets and work plans, but not among the core
functions of the extension staff, who consisted of both
NAADS and ‘non-NAADS’ LG staff. For some of the
districts, plant clinic operations remained dependent on
CABI funding.
Over the period under review, the plant clinic initiative was
rolled out in a rather loose and unregulated manner. The roles
and responsibilities of MAAIF, LGs, NGOs and CABI were
apparently not clearly agreed upon. LGs had not been in-
volved in the formulation of the plant clinic component of
the Development Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP), so the
mode of operationalization remained undefined. It was not
clear who was providing overall championship and leader-
ship, MAAIF or CABI, to guarantee that basic standards and
procedures were in place and followed up. While the basic
aspects of plant clinic operations were well understood by all
organisations, no common standards were established inter-
nally in the plant clinic organisations or externally from the
backstopping institutions. Accordingly, no shared norms re-
garding record keeping, use of plant clinic data, monitoring
and reporting, coordination and communication were discern-
ible. Each district tended to address its plant clinic challenges
in its own way. A first step towards understanding the faulty
plant clinic implementation is to recognise the hurdles to
implementing the DSIP.
Table 1 DSIP and key actors of relevance to the plant clinic initiative
Subject Acronym Description
DSIP
Development Strategy and Investment Plan DSIP The DSIP constitutes the national policy for development of the agricultural
sector in Uganda. DSIP is implemented by MAAIF, its agencies and Local
Governments (MAAIF 2010).
Component 1.
The Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness
Advisory Services Project
ATAAS ATAAS is a program implemented by NAADS and NARO and constitutes
the largest component of DSIP (World Bank 2010a)
Component 2. ‘non-ATAAS’ All the DSIP components outside the ATAAS.
Actor
Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry
and Fisheries
MAAIF Lead ministry in charge of overall DSIP management and implementation
Department of Crop Protection DCP Department of MAAIF in charge of the Pest and Disease Control component
of the DSIP, which includes support to plant clinics
The National Agricultural Advisory
Services
NAADS Semi-autonomous agency under MAAIF in charge of delivering agricultural
advisory services through LGs under ATAAS. Plant clinics not formally part
NAADS, but NAADS staff run plant clinics in some districts
The National Agricultural Research Organisation NARO NARO is the apex body of the national agricultural research system in Uganda
and in charge of technology development under ATAAS. Ad hoc informal
engagement with the plant clinics.
Local Government LG LGs are responsible for delivering agricultural advisory services under NAADS,
as well as ‘non-NAADS’ functions such as pest and disease control, extension,
regulation, planning and statistics. Both NAADS and ‘non-NAADS’ extension
workers operate as plant doctors.
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DSIP implementation in general— through the road blocks
A closer look at the overall implementation of the Develop-
ment Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP) shows that many
of the plant clinic challenges were not limited to this compo-
nent of the strategy. Soon after the approval of the DSIP in
2010, critical voices pointed out that the ‘non-ATAAS’ com-
ponents (Table 1) of the DSIP (all that is not covered by
ATAAS) would be problematic to implement, since they did
not match the governance structure and institutional setup of
MAAIF and its agencies. Criticism was expressed both from
MAAIF and donor representatives about the design and level
of ambition of the DSIP. As one MAAIF official noted, ‘The
implementation of DSIP is haunted by the in-built contradic-
tions. The ministry is structured by sub-sector but the DSIP is
designed by function. It is not implementable.’
Seeking a pragmatic solution to these problems with the
implementation structure developed byMAAIF with substan-
tial donor participation, a new action plan was designed for the
20 ‘non-ATAAS’ components of the DSIP (MAAIF 2012).
The plan prioritizes 13 major value chains and several themat-
ic areas. In the plan’s base document, pest and disease control
is only given a fleeting mention under ‘climate change’ in the
section on ‘cross-cutting issues’ as follows: ‘Plant pests and
diseases will be addressed by strengthening phytosanitary and
quarantine services… This will protect Uganda’s crops and
environment from invasive species.’ In addition, distribution
of quality seed/seedlings is mentioned as a preventative mea-
sure under the value chains section.
Plant clinics are not specifically mentioned in the non-
ATAAS action plan. No reference is made to their strategic
purpose and contribution to plant health system strengthen-
ing as enshrined in the DSIP. Instead, the non-ATAAS plan
appears to revert to a narrow view of crop protection that
focuses entirely on clean seed and border protection. This
suggests that there was insufficient awareness about or buy-
in into the plant clinic idea outside the Department of Crop
Protection.
Furthermore, the financing of the non-ATAAS plan was
uncertain. As of late 2012 only 47 % of the staff necessary to
implement the DSIP was in place. In the foreword to the plan,
the Minister of Agriculture explains,
‘implementation of the action plans […] will require
tremendous human and financial resources. Already the
sector faces an average annual funding gap of about
Uganda shillings 150 billion [ca. 30 % gap]; as com-
pared to the DSIP ideal budget. I therefore urge all our
Development Partners to avail the required resources to
implement the action plans in this document. As Gov-
ernment, we will continue to mobilize resources to de-
velop the agriculture sector’ (MAAIF 2012) (1 US
dollar=2,605 Ugandan Shillings).
Due to the limited coordination and alignment among
donors, however, the implementation of the non-ATAAS
components follows a ‘piecemeal approach’ with donors
supporting selected areas on a project basis:
‘We are supposed to align our efforts but this is not
happening. Recently, new donors have come on board
but they pick their priority topics, which sometimes don’t
even fit with the overall DSIP. The Sector Working Group
was supposed to guide and oversee the implementation
underMAAIF’s leadership but it is not working very well,’
noted a donor representative deeply frustrated by the uncoor-
dinated implementation. The presence of donor projects may in
itself contribute to some fragmentation within the responsible
agencies. Several studies (Ssewanyana et al. 2009; Kjær and
Joughin 2012) indicate that MAAIF has long been subject to
some ‘projectification’whereby each sub-department has access
to a donor project or two and the benefits that this entails. Such
‘projectification’, however, has a negative impact on overall
coordination and coherence in agricultural sector policy. Dis-
agreements among donors and a general lack of trust in
MAAIF’s ability to effectively implement policy were also cited
as reasons for this fragmentation of effort. It was not only within
the donor community that lack of coherence was noted. When
asked about the invisibility of the plant clinics in the non-ATAAS
plan, a senior official from the Department of Crop Protection
expressed his disapproval of the plan: ‘the non-ATAAS plan is a
donor construct. We don’t pay a lot of attention to it. The divide
between ATAAS and non-ATAAS is artificial.’ He reiterated the
Ministry’s commitment to rolling out plant clinics across the
country by referring to the 70millionUgandan Shilling (~28,000
USD) allocation in the new DSIP budget for 2013/2014.5
Why has is it been so difficult for MAAIF and its agencies
to formulate meaningful agricultural policies and implement
them in a coherent and effective manner? In the following
sections we examine the causes.
Explaining the difficulties in implementing plant clinics
At the policy level, the plant clinics were recognised. None-
theless, we found several structural and contextual obstacles
that caused the problems outlined above, making it difficult
for the districts to implement the plant clinics and for the
Department of Crop Protection to play the leading role it
was assigned in the DSIP. In particular, the politics around
decentralization, NAADS, national elections and a new dis-
trict reform, as well as the unclear belonging of plant clinics
provide an important context in which to understand the
challenges of plant clinic implementation.
5 MAAIF Ministerial Policy Statement 2013/14
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Decentralization and political imperatives
Agricultural extension was decentralised in 1997 as part of
major donor-supported decentralization reforms taking place
along with the general liberalisation processes (Local Govern-
ments Act 1997). Though well intentioned, for example by
aiming to improve accountability and effectiveness in local
service delivery (Bashaasha et al. 2011), some of these devel-
opments also served to weaken key departments in MAAIF
(Interview with a former Minister of Agriculture). The Exten-
sion Directorate of MAAIF was abolished in 1998 when LGs
took over responsibility for agricultural extension, and in 2001
NAADS was established as a new statutory semi-autonomous
body under MAAIF (Bashaasha et al. 2011).
There is a ubiquitous feeling that decentralisation took
place too quickly leading to MAAIF’s drastically decreased
human capacity and the LGs’ limited capacity to undertake
their new roles. Consequently cross-cutting functions such as
pest and disease control in animals and crops were left in a
vacuum. The districts ended up with parallel extension sys-
tems, NAADS and ‘non-NAADS’, which frustrated the dis-
tricts’ efforts to establish effective farmer support services.
The roles and authority of LGs vis-à-vis MAAIF were never
adequately spelled out, leaving both with insufficient means
and structures to set up an effective system for pest and disease
control (MAAIF 2012; Rwamigisa et al. 2013; interviews
with MAAIF and LG senior officials).
There have been many efforts to reform MAAIF so as to
improve its efficiency and responsiveness to a sector with
many and diverse players. The results, however, have been
disappointing. MAAIF has a long track record of inefficiency,
fragmentation (‘departmentalization’, ‘projectification’) and
institutional instability (MAAIF 2012; Batekega et al. 2013).
Coordination between sector agencies is weak. Poor incentive
systems, heavy bureaucracy and a long history of under-
performing have created a demotivating work environment
for staff (EPRC 2009; Pasipanodya 2011). A Senior MAAIF
Official explained that the problems with agricultural policies
in Uganda are largely institutional with lots of disruptions
from changing policies and restructuring, leaving government
institutions in a state of permanent transition. This, they sug-
gest, led to significant resistance to reform within MAAIF.
Coupled with the establishment of semi-autonomous agen-
cies, notably NAADS and NARO, which drained MAAIF of
human and financial capacity (Rwamigisa et al. 2013), the
unclear lines of authority have undermined the Ministry’s
ability to supervise the districts. One of MAAIF’s formal
functions is to ‘monitor, inspect, evaluate and harmonize
activities in the agricultural sector including local
governments’ (MAAIF’s website6), yet in reality this function
is arduous. Several MAAIF staff members mentioned that the
district governance structure limits the Ministry’s authority
and ability to engage directly with the District Production
Departments. The lines of command following the decentral-
isation entailed a reporting structure where district technical
department heads report to the district Chief Administrative
Officer rather than to the line ministries. A senior official from
MAAIF lamented the situation:
‘The linkage to the districts is not as strong as we would
want because they are under a different administration.
We have the technical input but not the administrative
linkage. We don’t have that muscle to order them
around!’
Another MAAIF senior official expressed deep frustration
with the lack of authority and resources to handle major pests
and enforce regulations:
‘We are failing. Farmers end up confused. Many differ-
ent people work on different aspects of pest and disease
control and people get inconsistent advice. There are
more pests and diseases than ever before but what we
are doing is merely firefighting.’
The weak relationship with the Ministry was also felt in
the districts. ‘There is a wide gap between the Ministry and
the districts. There is very little follow up on all activities.
The institutional arrangements are inadequate; the struc-
tures are weak and underfunded’, observed a District
NAADS Coordinator from the Teso region. This notion
was shared by another District NAADS Coordinator who
asserted that district staff would feel stronger and more
confident with better backstopping and enforcement from
MAAIF. A senior MAAIF official explained the implica-
tions for disease control:
‘The districts carry out disease surveys each in their
own way, without any standardisation and coordinated
follow up. Activities are scattered and fragmented, and
many pests and diseases are getting out of control. If
something is not done soon on cassava brown streak we
will not have cassava in five years’ time’.
He explained further that the by-laws are not ‘biting’ be-
cause the districts are reluctant to take instructions from the
central level and because MAAIF itself does not have the
capacity to follow up. He further stated that the situation was
aggravated by lack of up-to-date laws and regulations. Despite
many attempts to revise the law, the legal framework for pest
and disease control is still defined by the Plant Protection Act
of 1962. This antiquated law, for example, stipulates a penalty
of 2,000 Ugandan Shilling (less than one US dollar) for not
complying with an order of an agricultural inspector.6 http://www.agriculture.go.ug/About-Us/77
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The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS)
stealing the attention
Since its inception, the NAADS programme has been the
subject of major debates and controversies, both internally
and among the donor community (Kjær and Joughin 2012;
Rwamigisa et al. 2013). This has resulted in a stop-go process
characterised by a sense of insecurity about the future of the
programme. Many of the problems encountered related to
inadequacies in service provider capacity, local buy-in, co-
funding by districts, and public accountability (Muwonge
2007; Bashaasha et al. 2011; Kjær and Joughin 2012; Sseguya
et al. 2012). With time, politicians became increasingly in-
volved in the implementation of NAADS. A well-funded
programme that reached many farmers became tempting to
use to win votes in the period leading up to elections (Kjær
and Joughin 2012). This may explain why an input support
component was added to NAADS prior to the 2006 elections.
The location of the NAADS secretariat outside MAAIF’s
governance structure and its relatively small size also made
it more vulnerable to political interference (Rwamigisa et al.
2013). Matters were also not helped by the design of the
second phase NAADS during 2009–2010 coinciding with
the electoral campaigns, something that engendered differ-
ences of opinion and protracted negotiations between the
Government and donor community. Disagreements about
governance structure and procedures for selecting beneficiary
farmers led to the withdrawal of some donors from the pro-
gramme, e.g. European Union and Danida, thus creating
uncertainty about the future direction and scope of NAADS
(interviews with donor representatives). All district agricultur-
al extension activities, including plant clinics, were affected
by the delayed initiation of the new phase of NAADS and the
uncertainty about its future.
The increased role of the politicians in the implementation
of NAADS together with some of the features of the NAADS
prototype have had several effects. First, the autonomy of
NAADS apparently made it difficult for MAAIF to synchro-
nize NAADS with ‘non-NAADS’ activities and balance the
budgets. Empowered by its own Parliamentary Act, govern-
ment commitments to donors and hence its own budget line,
NAADS became the flagship for government support to the
agricultural sector. To the public, government investment in
agriculture equalled NAADS and NARO. In the period 2005–
2008, 39 % of the allocations to agriculture went to NAADS
and 20 % to research (NARO) (Table 2). Less than 1 % went
to plant pest and disease control, which was considerably less
than the average budgeted 5 %. Other key functions were also
consistently underfunded compared to the budgets. According
to the Uganda Agriculture Public Expenditure Review (World
Bank 2010b) the result was that ‘operating funds for the
technical departments are severely constrained, rendering
them ineffective’. The heavy prioritization of NAADS and
NARO led to significant resentment within MAAIF
(Rwamigisa et al. 2013).
Likewise, the transfer of technical capacity and resources
from LG to NAADS negatively affected the ability of LGs to
carry out other core functions (Rwamigisa et al. 2013). Over
90 % of the district agricultural budgets were earmarked to
NAADS (World Bank 2013). As a senior official from
MAAIF explained,
‘The LG extension staff are mandated to fulfil several
functions: regulation, pest and disease control, exten-
sion, planning and statistics. But with NAADS, the ex-
tension workers were taken off to only do extension. This
left a big gap regarding the fulfilment of the other
functions.’
This skewed prioritization was further exacerbated as
NAADS increasingly became an input supply programme,
with more than two thirds of the NAADS allocations going
to direct input-support.7 In a recent NAADS progress report it
is recognised that ‘the limited focus of the agricultural advi-
sory services needs to be addressed’, for example by
‘supporting interventions to control major tropical plant dis-
eases that are threatening food security and incomes (Banana
Bacterial Wilt, Cassava Brown Streak Virus) (NAADS 2013).
Plant clinics were not mentioned as a priority intervention,
suggesting that there was limited awareness about the plant
clinics within NAADS at central level.
We found no example of direct financial contribution from
the NAADS budgets to the plant clinics. The acceptance of
including the plant clinics in the NAADS activities in several
districts thus was apparently nominal. The current budget
structure of NAADS does not allow enough local discretion-
ary expenditure. ‘This year’s (2011) NAADS budget is very
tight,’ one of the District NAADS Coordinators said. A senior
official from the NAADS Secretariat confirmed that there
were few available funds for field activities and little flexibil-
ity in how NAADS operates. The funding dilemma has been
deepened by the creation of new districts (see next section)
and the reduced funding commitment from donors to the new
phase of NAADS.
The turbulence caused by general elections and district reform
Plant clinic implementation was further affected by the polit-
ical circumstances in the study period, which was dominated
by elections and a new local government districting reform.
Before the 2011 elections, new districts were formed, increas-
ing the number to 112 districts whereas there were about 29 in
7 This was expressed by several informants, among others a former senior
official with the NAADS secretariat, a former minister for agriculture, a
District NAADS Coordinator from Eastern Uganda and a Local Council
V Chairman from Central Uganda.
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the early 1990s (Kjær and Katusiimeh 2012; Green 2008).
New districts are popular because they offer an opportunity
for patronage through political appointments and other bene-
fits for the local constituency (Green 2008). For the citizens it
also makes sense given that the size of conditional grants
extended by the central government to the districts is based
on the district as a unit rather than district population.
The number of sub-national administrative units is now one
of the highest in the world, making them financially non-
viable and difficult to supervise. Many districts are small
and weak with limited revenue base; they do not have budgets
for more than the earmarked funds that they get from central
transfers to cover health and education, but not production
sectors. Overall, LG capacity is weak, characterized by low
staff retention, low payments, delayed pay and low staff
morale (Bashaasha et al. 2011). The 2013 Public Expenditure
Review reported that 40 % of district government positions
were vacant (World Bank 2013). One implication of this
proliferation of districts is that their capacity to implement
any policy has been undermined, as the case of the plant
clinics demonstrates. Political functions interfered with public
sector activities for many months while the recruitment and
relocation of staff to new districts took up a significant amount
of time and resources (interviews with plant doctors, District
Agricultural Officers and District NAADS Coordinators).
Unclear belonging—the plant clinics fall through the cracks
The dual purpose of the plant clinics created uncertainty about
where they ‘belonged’. Was it under extension or under pest
and disease control? Under NAADS or ‘non-NAADS’? What
was the role of MAAIF vs. LGs? This uncertainty, which was
further fuelled by the notion that pest and disease control is
‘something MAAIF and LG do’, was an obstacle to plant
clinic institutionalisation.
According to MAAIF’s website, the Department of Crop
Protection is in charge of ‘all matters related to plant health’.
Yet, the term ‘plant health’ (often used interchangeably with
‘pest and disease control’ or ‘crop protection’) is by and large
used synonymously with establishment and enforcement of
rules and regulations, as described by MAAIF: ‘…. including
issuance of import and export phytosanitary certificates …
[and] plant pest prevention or eradication programmes. The
department is also responsible for enforcing regulations on
registration and the use of pesticides and other
agrochemicals’.8 Stating that the Department is in charge of
‘all matters related to plant health’ is somewhat misleading.
Many other actors play a significant role in delivering plant
health support services, information and technologies to
farmers: advisory services (NAADS, NGOs and private sec-
tor), research (universities, national and international research
institutes) and input supply (agro input dealers, NAADS and
NGOs). This semantic disagreement about the meaning of
‘plant health’ contributes to the ‘orphaning’ of the plant clinics.
Many key documents retain this narrow and discordant defini-
tion of actor roles in plant health (or pest and disease control).
For example, the base ATAAS document states that ‘frontline
extension workers, not engaged under the NAADS programme
will be re-assigned to non-extension functions, such as pest
and disease control’ (World Bank 2010a).
Lack of a clear belonging for the plant clinics and the
associated mismatch between institutional mandates and allo-
cated resources limited the scope of plant clinic actions both at
district and central level. Table 3 illustrates the mandates and
Table 2 Proportion of MAAIF
budget allocated to DSIP priority
areas, compared with DSIP pro-
jections, 2005/06 to 2007/08
(percent) (World Bank 2010b)
Budget allocations Av. allocations
over the period
DSIP
average budget
projections2005/
06
2006/
07
2007/
08
Research 17 19 23 20 19
Advisory services (NAADS) 30 45 41 39 29
Livestock disease 9 7 4 7 6
Plant pests and diseases 1 1 0 1 5
Livestock and fish regulatory
services
2 2 2 2 5
Planning and policy 2 2 1 2 1
Institutional development 4 1 0 2 9
Water capacity building 3 4 4 4 10
Seed capacity development 9 3 3 5 8
Processing and marketing 7 2 2 3 3
Physical infrastructure 12 14 18 15 5
Promotion 3 1 1 2 1
8 http://www.agriculture.go.ug/departments/91. Accessed 20 August
2014
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relative resources of MAAIF, LG (‘non-NAADS’) and
NAADS within pest and disease control and agricultural ex-
tension. MAAIF and LGs have the formal mandate to control
pests and diseases yet they have limited resources and capacity
to fulfil this mandate. On the other hand, NAADS has the
mandate and resources to deliver extension (syn. advisory
services), but NAADS’ commodity orientation (farmer groups
select up to three commodities) and the broader mandate of
plant clinics (‘any crop, any problem’) are at odds.
How these mismatches were dealt with varied among the
districts depending on the inclination of the LG leadership.
Hoima, Soroti and Buikwe LGs saw no contradiction between
the NAADS mandate and that of the plant clinics, while
NAADS leadership in Mukono perceived the plant clinics as a
separate LG responsibility that did not belong under the
NAADS. The District NAADS Coordinator of Buikwe ex-
plained that the plant clinics were in the quarterly LG work plan
and budget but not mentioned directly in the terms of reference
of the NAADS service providers. ‘The service providers have a
list of things they are supposed to do, including ‘any other duties
as may be assigned from time to time’. So the plant clinics are
covered, though not explicitly,’ he explained. In reality though,
the plant clinics maintained their informal status. Several plant
doctors mentioned that plant clinic sessions were sometimes
cancelled due to clashes with the schedules of core NAADS
activities. CABI’s lack of attention to the structural misfit of plant
clinics contributed to the notion that they were a ‘CABI project’.
One of the weaknesses identified in the first phase of the
NAADS was that the programme worked largely through its
own parallel structure detached from the rest of the LG. That
made it difficult to create the necessary synergies with the LG
production departments (World Bank 2010b). The intention of
the new phase of NAADS was thus to adjust and align better
with the LG structure. However, some issues that place the plant
clinics in a governance void remain. Some of the plant clinics in
Buikwe, for example, were run by NAADS staff. Yet, as stated
by the District NAADS Coordinator, ‘The plant doctors do not
report directly to me but to the District Production and Mar-
keting Officer because in the work plan the plant clinics are not
directly under NAADS advisory service.’ In the opinion of a
senior MAAIF official the perceived mismatch between the
mandates of NAADS vs. LG (non-NAADS) is not real:
‘To think that NAADS doesn’t work on pests and dis-
eases is wrong. The plant clinics should be an instru-
ment for NAADS to identify key problems, and then
design an activity to be done. Few people have
conceptualised it that way. NAADS provides advisory
services on pest and diseases, soils, agronomy, value
addition and so on. When you do extension you do it on
all topics’.
A sub-county chief of Ngora district agreedwith this notion
and suggested that NAADS should take over plant clinics
since NAADS deals with production and have the staff to do
so: ‘You cannot deal with production without addressing pests
and diseases’.
According to Thomas and Grindle (1990), policies need an
implementing agency with the requisite capacity and mandate
to ensure systematic operationalization. Furthermore, the
agency must have the necessary authority and space to ade-
quately guide the operations of the local government officers
(Tendler 1997). The implementation of plant clinics in Ugan-
da has clearly lacked such implementing agency.
Addressing the challenges—in Uganda and elsewhere
Every country has its own history and political context that
shapes institutions and policy implementation. In
neighbouring Kenya, the introduction of plant clinics was
much smoother than in Uganda for two reasons. First, the
institutional structures and lines of authority gave the plant
clinics a clear belonging from the start. Agricultural exten-
sion was centralised and managed directly by the Ministry
of Agriculture, so when the Ministry approved plant clinics
as a new extension method, the initial planning and start-up
went fairly quickly. Second, the plant clinics fitted perfectly
with the existing ‘information desk’ approach to extension
(Romney et al. 2013). Unlike in Uganda where NAADS’
commodity focus creates a mismatch with the plant clinic
approach, the information desks address any problem pre-
sented by the farmers. Key challenges for Kenya are, how-
ever, to create functional linkages between the plant clinics
and the regulatory services, which are managed by a semi-
autonomous agency, KEPHIS (Kenya Plant Health Inspec-
torate Services), and to adjust to the new structures defined
by the ongoing decentralisation reform which was intro-
duced in the new Constitution of 2010. Also in other coun-
tries where plant clinics are introduced, such as Nicaragua,
Peru and India, agricultural extension and/or regulatory
Table 3 Mandate vs. resources of government agencies in Uganda for
pest and disease control and agricultural extension (syn. advisory
services)
Area MAAIF LG (non-NAADS) NAADS
Pest and disease control
Mandate ××× ××× ×
Resources × × ×
Agricultural extension
Mandate × ×× ×××
Resources × × ××
×××−strong; ××− medium; ×−limited
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services fall under the responsibility of semi-autonomous
organisations.
It is unlikely that the uncertainty about funding and future
direction of the agricultural sector institutions in Uganda will
change in the near future. Recently, the Government presented
plans for a new major extension reform, which implies
restructuring of NAADS and merging with LG extension as
part of a centralised, so-called ‘single spine’ extension system,
managed by a new directorate under MAAIF and supported
by the army (Daily Monitor 27 January 2014; New Vision 21
March 2014; Daily Monitor 16 June 2014).9 The lack of
coherence in agricultural policy implementation in Uganda
makes the implementation of plant clinics a major challenge.
There is a risk that they will become just another project
within a fragmented sector and remain at the periphery of
budgets and policy plans.
The plant clinics do not fit easily into the existing structures
due to their dual-purpose nature and the mismatch between
mandates, authority and resources within the Ugandan insti-
tutions. In the initial agreements with CABI, MAAIF was
given the role as coordinator and later as overall manager of
the plant clinic data. Yet, this arrangement didn’t take suffi-
cient account of the institutional complexities and it never got
to work as expected.
There was a general consensus among plant clinic staff and
coordinators that the formal integration of plant clinics into
NAADS is a key condition for institutionalisation and sus-
tainability. This, however, would require a change in
NAADS’ current focus on a few crops and input supply, as
well as clarity about roles and authority at the different
governance levels. Drawing a parallel to human health,
Mitchell and Bossert (2010) argue that a balance is needed
between centralisation of some health system functions (e.g.
handling disease outbreaks, administration of health informa-
tion management system) and decentralisation of others (e.g.
primary healthcare services) to achieve health system objec-
tives. A debate about centralised vs. decentralised functions in
plant health systems is a vital part of broadening the prevailing
narrow interpretation of plant health.
Despite the unstable policy environment in Uganda, the
official approval of plant clinics as a means to help safeguard
plant health offers opportunities for negotiating solutions to
the structural challenges identified in this paper. The question
remains to what extent the commitment and enthusiasm of
individuals can break the deep-rooted institutional barriers. In
2012, MAAIF in collaboration with the Plantwise programme
of CABI started planning a major scale out of plant clinics
across Uganda. For such expansion to become successful, the
fundamental issues of governance, resources and implemen-
tation structure at districts vs. central level need to be
considered.
Conclusion
Plant clinics have grown in popularity in Uganda since their
inception in 2006. These farmer services are seen as a most
needed means to support farmers in their effort to curtail the
ever growing threats of pests and diseases. Incorporating plant
clinics into the national strategy for agricultural development
was a sign of political will by Uganda’s government and an
important step towards their institutionalisation. Yet, the po-
litical agendas surrounding agricultural policies in Uganda
have created weak and fragmented institutions, undermining
the implementation of the intended policy. The existence of a
double-stranded extension system, NAADS and ‘non-
NAADS’, with mismatching mandates and resources place
the plant clinics in a void. AlthoughMAAIF took the initiative
to make plant clinics a government priority, the ministry’s
weak implementing capacity vis-a-vis decentralised delivery
of agricultural extension makes it hard to make reality of the
good intentions. Uganda faces a steep challenge in establish-
ing appropriate institutional arrangements that grant plant
clinics a solid basis for effective operation, despite a turbulent
policy environment. The Ugandan experience shows the im-
portance of understanding not only the policy and institutional
frameworks in which plant clinics operate, but also the effects
of political imperatives and donors on policy implementation.
Decision-makers and implementers need to be aware of polit-
ical agendas and institutional arrangements to understand the
scope of interventions and to find ways to circumvent embed-
ded obstacles that are not always clearly reflected in policy
and strategy documents. The policy analysis presented here is
specific for Uganda but many aspects of policy coherence and
implementation apply to any country.
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